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THE ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION
AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
BRIAN P. BELLMORE-
In this paper the nature and source of an administrative agency's
adjudicative and rule-making power will be examined, the manner in
which the Ontario Securities Commission carries out its duties under
the Securities Act analysed, an alternative approach utilised by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States examined,
and possible improvements in the Ontario Commission's administra-
tion by adoption of this method, considered. The merits or demerits of
Commission policy will not be discussed as this study is confined to an
examination of the manner in which that policy is administered.
I. The Nature of the Administrative Agency
In performing their various functions, administrative agencies act
as arms not only of the executive, but of the legislature and the
judiciary. In the first capacity they carry out tasks which, in early
days, were performed personally by department heads. This is the
day-to-day work of the agency. In the second aspect they adopt regu-
lations which have much the same effect as statute law. In the third
instance, they interpret and apply established legal norms and engage
in court-like adjudicatory processes.
The Ontario Securities Commission has not resorted to the rule-
making process in any significant degree, favouring the adjudicative
approach to implement the legislation. However, these adjudications
have not been extensively reported,1 and those which are often do not
contain any specific policy principles which indicate the factors rele-
vant in interpreting and exercising the statutory power. The unsatis-
factory result is that a great deal of Commission policy is unstated and
unknown to the financial industry which it regulates. This is fius-
trated in the dilemma which a lawyer who is quite active in the field
of securities regulation faced recently when retained to act for a
mutual fund. After gathering together all the law on mutual funds,
the decisions and statements of policy by the Commission, he found
they covered only a small portion of the field. The major part of the
law was contained in unpublished "departmental policy" which was
*Brian P. Bellmore is a member of the 1967 graduating class of Osgoode
Hall Law School.
1 See Baillie, J. W., The Protection of the Investor in Ontario, 8 Can. Pub.
Admin., 172 at 250.
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quite flexible and indefinite. We may commence, then, with the propo-
sition that whether the Commission chooses the adjudicative or rule-
making approach, the industry requires, and may have a right to
know, exactly what the policies are.
The source of these two approaches is in the discretionary power
of the tribunal. It is conferred on an agency when the Legislature
feels there ought to be some law to deal with a certain problem but
cannot decide in detail just what it should be. Therefore, it adopts a
statute declaring the general objectives which should be accomplished
and then grants to the agency a discretion to work out the best ways
to accomplish those objectives.
There are two types of administrative discretion:
(1) The agency may have power to adopt substantive rules having
the force of law and compelling or prohibiting specified practices on
the part of that class of persons mentioned in the regulations. In this
instance the agency exercises a quasi-legislative function in that it
utilises the same sort of discretionary powers as those of the Legisla-
ture and goes through similar preliminary steps to making the regula-
tion as the Legislature (i.e., it holds hearings and receives submissions
of interested parties before exercising the discretion). The question
whether the Ontario Securities Commission has been delegated such
power under the Act will be discussed later in the paper.
(2) The agency may be given a vague indefinite standard to
apply in the adjudication of individual cases-e.g., registration is only
granted to an applicant for a licence to sell securities if, in the opinion
of the Director, he is suitable for registration.2 In this adjudication
the legal status or the legality of acts and practices of named parties
to the hearing are determined.
Neither approach is specified to be followed by the Commission in
the legislation. Thus, it should be able to choose between these two
approaches, or reject both in favour of a more informal means of
regulation. Some of the less formal methods of administration are:
(i) The "lifted eyebrow" backed by a veiled threat of prosecu-
tion, non-renewal of a licence, publicity, delisting, rejection
of prospectus;
(ii) Private rulings (or the advisory opinion) which may or may
not be binding on the agency; and
(iii) Speeches and press releases announcing policy.
Although the Commission from time to time has resorted to all
of these methods, in this paper the discussion will be focused on the
more formal adjudicative and rule-making procedures.
A brief review of the background of the Commission and the
areas in which it acts reveals a certain maturation in the regulation
of the financial industry over the past twenty years. Following World
War II when modern securities legislation was just taking effect in
Canada, the job of the administrator was to put the most blatant
offenders in jail or out of the securities business and to halt the worst
2 The Securities Act, S.O. 1966, c. 142.
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fraud schemes. Today this negative objective of prevention of fraud is
joined with the new objectives of the Commission to equip the investor
with more information to permit him to make a better choice by
evaluating investments more accurately.
II. Areas Where the Commission Adjudicates
Generally, the Commission operates in four main areas: in the
granting or denial of registration of traders, acceptance or rejection of
prospectuses for filing, denial of the use of exemptions from filing, and
in the determination of the existence of primary distributions. Until
the present, the Commission has rejected rule-making in favour of a
case-by-case adjudication of each question, although there are indica-
tions that the former will be resorted to more frequently in the future.
III. The Adjudicative Procedure of the O.S.C.
An adjudication by the Commission will result from either one
of two preliminary procedures. The Commission may itself make an
order to investigate under section 21 where it appears probable that
a person or company has violated the Act or the Criminal Code, or
an individual may make an application for a direction, order or ruling
by the Commission as provided by the Act.3 In the former a report is
in all cases made by the investigator, while in the latter an investiga-
tion by the Commission staff may or may not be conducted.
When the report is received the Director makes the initial decision
in the matter after the person or company affected has been given a
hearing at which they may be represented by counsel. There is a right
of appeal from the Director's decision to the full Commission which
in practice constitutes a new hearing in which the Director's decision,
investigator's report and new evidence is considered. A final right of
appeal lies to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
In the initial investigation stage of this adjudicative process the
Act gives broad powers of search and seizure to the Commission. The
investigator may examine the affairs, property, documents and busi-
ness relations of the person or company under investigation within the
scope of the original order. He may summon and enforce the attend-
ance of witnesses to compel them to give evidence under oath and
require production of documents. 4 A person who refuses to appear or
produce records in his custody is liable to be committed for contempt
by a judge of the Supreme Court as if in breach of an order of that
court.5
The extent of these powers may give rise to a problem involving
the privilege against self-incrimination by a person compelled to attend
as a witness at the investigation. Under the present Act, no person can
refuse to answer any question on any ground of privilege. By invoking
the protection of the Canada Evidence Act,6 the witnesscan prevent
the use of his reply in a subsequent criminal proeeding. Similarly,
3 Id., note 2, ss. 7(2), 19(5), 61(2). /
4 Id., note 2, s. 21(3).
5 Id., note 2, s. 21(4).
6 R.S.C. 1952, c. 307, s. 5.
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section 9 (1) of the Ontario Evidence Act7 compels a witness to answer
incriminating questions while providing that such answers shall not
be used against him in any civil proceeding or in any proceeding under
any Act of the Legislature. It is submitted that the protection of these
two Acts does not extend to prosecutions under the Ontario Securities
Act. The federal Act cannot apply to offences created by a provincial
statute and the provincial Act only excludes from later proceedings
incriminating answers compelled by "this section [7(1)1, or any Act
of the Parliament of Canada". However, the witness in an investiga-
tion authorized under the present Securities Act is compelled to answer
by section 21(3) of that Act and not by section 7(1) or any federal
Act.
There has been a significant change in the new legislation. The
specific denial of a claim of privilege has been replaced by a general
delegation of power to the investigator which includes the same power
to summon and compel witnesses as that vested in the Supreme Court
in the trial of civil actions. Failure to answer questions or produce
documents as required by the investigator makes the person liable to
contempt proceedings. Since the investigator is now clothed with the
power of a Supreme Court officer, it may be contended that his power
to compel witnesses has the same source as that of the courts in civil
trials-the Ontario Evidence Act-and therefore the person who is
investigated is protected under section 7(1). But this is not clear
from the wording and the courts may strictly construe the section
holding that the Securities Act still confers the power.
Thus, where an investigator calls upon a person suspected of an
offence to answer incriminating questions under oath, that person
must answer or be in contempt, and those answers may be used in a
subsequent prosecution for a breach of the Securities Act which could
result in a fine of up to two thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for
up to one year.8 These answers may also give rise to prosecution under
the Criminal Code. In view of the fact that these penalties are more
severe than those for many criminal offences, and that the incrimi-
nating answer may give rise to a prosecution under the Criminal Code,
it is submitted that section 21(4) abrogrates the common law rule
expressed in the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare. In the recent
Supreme Court of Canada case, Batary v. Attorney-General for Sas-
katchewan, Cartwright J., speaking for the majority, held that:
any provincial legislation purporting to abrogate or alter the existing
rules which protect a person charged with crime from being compelled
to testify against himself, is legislation in relation to the Criminal Law
including the Procedure in Criminal Matters and so within the exclusive
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under head 27 of section
91 of the British North America Act.9
If provincial legislation cannot compel a person charged with
crime to give evidence tending to incriminate him, a fortiori it cannot
compel a person who has not even been charged to give evidence
7 R.S.O. 1960, c. 119, s. 7.
8 Supra, note 2, s. 136.
9 [19651 S.C.R. 465 at 478.
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which may result in the laying of a charge against him under the
Code. Thus, the Batary case indicates that section 21(4) may be
uZtra vires, as legislation relating to criminal procedures insofar as it
compels a person to answer incriminating questions which could result
in prosecutions under the Criminal Code.
The Legislature in the Evidence Act has recognized this problem
in relation to other quasi-criminal matters created by provincial
statutes, and while compelling the person to answer, has precluded
the use of those answers against him in a later prosecution. Securities
proceedings remain unique in denying this protection. It seems con-
trary to the principles of natural justice that a person being investi-
gated should be deprived of the protection against self-incrimination.
The Bill of Rights, although it has no effect in the area of provincial
legislation, recognized this and provided that no law of Canada shall
be construed so as to authorize a tribunal, commission, board or other
authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is denied protec-
tion against self-incrimination. 10 Legislative change which would
ensure this protection would assist rather than handicap the investi-
gator as it would probably result in less evasive and misleading
answers, and would remove an ethical conflict facing counsel for the
witness who must balance his duty to his client with his undertaking
never to counsel a violation of the law. Therefore, a change of the
wording in section 21(4), which would clearly indicate that the investi-
gator derives his power to compel witnesses from section 7(1) of the
Evidence Act, seems desirable.
The investigative procedure has also been criticized for not com-
plying with the requirements of natural justice. There is no difficulty
in this respect if the results of the investigation are just the basis of
a decision to hold a hearing. However, Williamson, in his book on
Securities Regulation, argues that where a decision as to an indi-
vidual's rights is based on the report of the investigator, that person
should be protected during the investigation by the same safeguards
proper to the decision-making process itself." These would include
notice to the person being investigated of the investigator's intent to
examine certain witnesses, and also the opportunity to be present and
cross-examine. Under the new legislation, a person giving evidence at
an investigation may be represented by counsel and may inspect and
copy documents seized by the investigator from him.12 But there is
no right to be present, represented by counsel or cross-examine when
other witnesses are giving evidence, nor is there any right to inspect
documents seized from other witnesses.
Mr. Williamson's argument has merit in view of the fact that the
results of the investigation are produced at the hearing in the form
of documents without any oral testimony against the individual being
adduced. This procedure results from the provision in the Act that
the Director or the full Commission on review is not bound by the best
10 1960 (Can.), c. 44, s. 2(d).
11 Williamson, Peter T., S.cumrIEs REGULATIO IN CANADA (Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1960), 229-232.
12 Supra, note 2, ss. 21(5), (7).
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evidence rule.13 Consequently, the individual at the hearing is con-
fronted with the problem of rebutting evidence without an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him or to inspect inculpatory
documents seized from others. (With respect to the latter, the Com-
mission, as a matter of practice, allows the individual to examine the
evidence against him immediately prior to the hearing though there is
no duty to do so in the statute.) In view of the natural tendency
all administrative tribunals have of relying heavily on the evidence
gathered by their own staff of investigators, the individual begins the
hearing burdened with an onus of refuting this evidence, which is
made more difficult by the absence of cross-examination and prior
inspection of evidence against him sufficient for the preparation of an
adequate rebuttal. In such a circumstance, the investigation and
decision-making are practically inseparable.
There are two main arguments against Williamson's proposals of
cross-examination during investigation. It would seriously delay and
impede the investigation which in the area of securities regulation
could result in great damage to the public. Also, an investigation under
this Act is not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, but rather an
administrative one designed merely to gather information on the basis
of which the Commission or the Attorney General can decide to pro-
ceed.14 There is no obligation in law on the administrator in perform-
ing such a function to follow any of the dictates of natural justice.
The arguments for and against cross-examination and prior in-
spection of evidence are well taken and, in such a case, a compromise
is submitted. Since delays and the St. John case render Williamson's
proposals unacceptable to the Commission, two changes at the hearing
stage of the proceedings may produce a similar result. Firstly, in
accord with the principle of natural justice enunciated in Re Allison
and the Court.of Referees,15 the person investigated should be provided
with meaningful notice of the hearing which, in addition to time and
place, should include the issues and allegations which he must face.
Perhaps the present.practice of furnishing the person with a copy of
the results of the investigation shortly before the hearing could be
extended to two weeks in advance of the hearing date.
Secondly, because the constant appearances before the tribunal
of staff investigators can result in bias in favour of their evidence, the
members of the tribunal should strive to eradicate any predispositions
they might have, and bring to the adjudication of the issue an impar-
tial mind which neither consciously or unconsciously imposes any onus
on the person investigated to rebut the evidence of Commission coun-
sel. However, this should in no way inhibit the members of the tri-
bunal from utilising their own expertise in deciding the case.
From a reading of the Act one could conclude that the hearings
before the Director would be conducted in the same manner as those
before the Commission. Although the same rules as to notice, power
13 Supra, note 2, s. 5(3).
14 Cf. St. John v. Fraser, [1935] S.C.R. 441; Guay v. La Fleur (1964),
47 D.L.R. (2d) 226.
'5 [1945] 2 D.L.R. 717.
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to summon and compel witnesses, admissibility of evidence, records,
reasons for decision and right to counsel apply to both,16 there is in
fact a considerable dichotomy in the manner in which they are con-
ducted which may be attributable to the particular conception each
tribunal has of its function.
The approach taken at the initial hearing is similar to that
adopted with considerable success in the United States. The hearing
is treated as the final step in the investigative process in which the
Director becomes an active participant confronting the person investi-
gated with the evidence gathered by the investigator and the Com-
mission Counsel, posing most of the questions to the witness and cross-
examining the evidence he adduces. Thus, the onus is on the individual
to rebut, explain or qualify the documentary evidence against him and
he is subject to strong cross-examination by both Commission Counsel
and the Director. On the other hand, the full Commission adopts a
more detached judicial approach being astute to give each side a full
opportunity to present its case and leaving the task of cross-examina-
tion to Commission Counsel.
The Americans have found that such a scheme of administration
avoids the possibility of bias and expedites the crucial initial decision.',
The United States lawmakers felt that a person presiding at a hearing
would not be able to bring an impartial mind to the evidence adduced
by the parties where one of these was a stranger, and the other a
member of the agency's investigative staff who regularly gathered
evidence for the tribunal and was a fulltime employee of it. Therefore,
they have improved the calibre of their investigators and completely
separated them from the tribunal. The senior investigators become
"hearing officers" empowered to hear evidence, prepare a record of
the relevant facts revealed at the hearing and during the investigation
and then to render an interim decision. If no objection is taken to this
decision by either of the parties within a specified time, it becomes
final. If it is not accepted, the adjudicative tribunal of the agency will
conduct a hearing with full opportunity for parties to lead new evi-
dence. This method has been quite successful with ninety-five per
cent of the initial decisions by the investigative staff being accepted.
Because of the relatively small number of cases which come before
the tribunal, the problem of prejudice toward one party's evidence due
to familiarity is removed, and the members have more time to devote
to other facets of administration-one of which is the preparation of
a body of rules.
Although this is a commendable procedure, under the present
Ontario legislation the Director is not intended to become a part of
the investigative branch of the Commission. Rules as to the conduct
of hearings are identical for the Director and the full Commission, and
indicate an expectation by the legislators that the hearings before
both tribunals be carried on in a similar impartial manner. Although
in practice the present approach has its advantages in expediting deci-
16 Supra, note 2, s. 5.
17 Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. ss. 1004-1007.
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sions, it must be remembered that in such hearings justice must not
only be done, but appear to be done.
Another difficulty at the initial decision-making stage arises from
the fact that there is presently no record taken of the evidence adduced
by any of the parties. This places the individual involved at a dis-
advantage on review since, in most cases, all the evidence against him
is contained in the documents introduced at the hearing, while most of
his evidence is oral. Thus, the appellant must re-introduce his oral
testimony and bring his witnesses back a second time if he appeals the
Director's decision. Also, in considering the basis of the Director's
decision, the Commission will only have access to the evidence of the
investigator and the important testimony of the individual himself is
unavailable unless re-introduced. In contrast, the Commission makes
a complete record of all evidence adduced at its hearings. These inequi-
ties should be removed, however, when section 5(4) of the new Act
requiring all oral evidence adduced at the Director's hearing be trans-
cribed, comes into force.
The traditional freedom an administrative agency has to prescribe
its own procedures is tempered with certain non-statutory standards
of natural justice which must be observed in all decisions affecting the
rights of parties. The Ontario courts have adopted the requirements
laid down by the House of Lords in Board of Education v. Rice:
The tribunal must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides
and must grant a fair opportunity to the parties for correcting or contra-
dicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.
1 8
Williamson suggests that this requires the evidence gathered by
the investigator be freshly adduced at the hearing and that the indi-
vidual be given an adequate opportunity to confront those who de-
nounce him. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Securities
Act and Gardiner held that because the Act provided that the Commis-
sion was not bound by technical rules of evidence, it was free to obtain
information in any way it felt was best.' 9 Consequently this case
vitiates any requirement that evidence be freshly adduced and subject
to cross-examination, although the Supreme Court of Ontario insists
that in the absence of cross-examination the individual be given a
reasonable opportunity to disprove evidence against his case.20
It is submitted that the present hearing given the individual is
inadequate to enable him to disprove the evidence against him, and
thus falls short of the requirements of natural justice. The extremely
active participation by the Director and the limited opportunity given
the individual before the hearing to examine the allegations made
against him are not conducive to a full and fair hearing of both sides
of the case. Though there is presently no statutory requirement that
the investigator's report be disclosed to the individual Gale J., (s he
then was) in Re Knapman and the Board of Health of the Township of
18 [1911] A.C. 179 at 182.
19 [1948] O.R. 71.
20 Re Fairfield Modem Dairy Limited and the Milk Control Board of
Ontario, [1942] O.W.N. 579; Re Jackson and Ontario Labour Relations Board,
[1955] O.R. 83.
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Saltfteet denounced the procedure of calling on a person to give evi-
dence at a hearing where the propriety of his conduct was in issue
without informing him of the allegations against him.2' Presently, the
individual is confronted at the initial hearing with evidence he has
never seen before and which is usually the basis of a decision which
seriously affects his rights. Without the benefit of cross-examination
such evidence, no matter how experienced and impartial the person
who gathers it may be, is subject to the usual problems of faulty
memories, misinterpretation of facts and statements, exaggerations,
and, in the area of registration and cancellation, is often the product
of deep prejudices. Because these deficiencies cannot be brought to
the Director's attention by way of cross-examination, it is most impor-
tant that the individual investigated be given a better opportunity to
rebut the evidence than he now receives. This could be accomplished
if the recommendation above, that he be given a copy of the investiga-
tor's report and the allegations against him one to two weeks in
advance of the hearing, were implemented. In this way he would be
able to prepare his rebuttal, assemble relevant material, marshal his
defences and participate more meaningfully in the hearing than in
the present circumstances where he is suddenly faced with damaging
accusations and evidence and is forced to make an extemporaneous
rebuttal.
IV. The AZternative of Rule-making
Having examined the way in which the Commission administers
by adjudication, the question arises whether this is the best vehicle
to formulate policy and establish standards for regulating the indus-
try. Professor Shapiro, in a recent article, submits that agencies could
improve their administration by resorting to rule-making rather than
adjudication.22 In light of the above criticisms, there may be a possi-
bility of improving the administration of the Securities Act by utilising
this process.
First let us examine the advantages of adjudication before con-
sidering its replacement. It is wrong to say that adjudication fails to
lay down any clear standards to guide the industry. Not all cases are
specific applications of a general statutory provision to a single factual
situation. Rules declared in recent Commission decisions include
declarations pertaining to presumptions based on experience acquired
in similar cases, the shifting of the onus of proof in application for
regiptration as securities salesmen,23 and in issues whether the pro-
moter has received an unconscionable consideration for his claims.24 In
some instances it may not be wise for the Commission to lay down
inflexible rules to govern all cases. Even after considerable experi-
ence it may be best to do no more than announce factors to be con-
sidered if the situation arises, for it is a fact of life that deceitful
21 [1954] O.R. 360.
22 Shapiro, David L., The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921.
23 Percy Brand, O.S.C. July 1966 Bulletin.
24 Prima Mines Ltd., O.S.C. Oct. 1966 Bulletin.
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men will search for loopholes to avoid the spirit of the law. In other
areas it may be necessary to gain experience through the adjudication
of many cases before regulations can be formulated to elaborate on
the general discretion given the Commission by the Act. Finally,
administrators who have experienced the reaction of the public to a
policy enunciated in a case as compared to one promulgated by a rule
feel that adjudication is more advantageous. When the policy appears
in the form of a regulation there is a tendency to evaluate it in terms
of the maximum possible scope of its language. Highly unusual factual
situations which might fall within the literal meaning of the rule are
envisioned and viewed with alarm even though no sensible administra-
tor would give the rule such an extreme interpretation. Thus, there is
a distortion of the policy laid down in a rule while the policy estab-
lished in an adjudication is evaluated in its factual context.
In certain areas, however, the advantages offered by rule-making
recommend it as a superior means of developing and promulgating
policy.
(1) The opportunity for submissions from parties interested but
not involved in the present litigation is negligible in adjudications but
a dominant characteristic of rule-making. In the latter process, notice
is given to the industry that rules are being drafted in a particular
area and representations are entertained. The increased participation
that results will inevitably produce a sounder policy than one resulting
from consideration of submissions by one or two litigants in an adjudi-
cation.
(2) Where administrative courts depend on the accident of litiga-
tion to initiate policy formulation, rule-making affords the administra-
tor the opportunity for advance planning and an organized approach.
(3) Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of
Appeals submits that formal rules have an advantage over adjudica-
tions for defining standards because they make possible the avoidance
of trivia and personalities involved in individual cases and permit
administrators to concentrate on the principles involved.25
(4) There is a greater flexibility in procedures available in rule-
making than in adjudications where the tribunal is bound to observe
the dictates of natural justice. In rule-making the agency can consult
its staff, hear wide-ranging submissions from third parties affected by
the proposed policy and limit or forbid oral testimony and cross-
examination which could slow the process.
(5) Rules laid down by adjudication are often hidden because of
the many cases which have previously been decided and been com-
bined to establish the rule. A person not familiar with the agency's
previous decisions will have to review all previous cases on the point
when researching a policy set out in an adjudication. The difficulty
of the search is aggravated by the fact that there is no complete
report of earlier Commission decisions. On the other hand, the issu-
ance of regulations would give a clear and accessible source of Com-
25 Henry J. Friendly, The FederaZ Administrative Agencies, 75 Harv.
L.Rev. 863.
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mission policy to all who seek it, providing, of course, that the Com-
mission has the power to enact them.
V. The Power to Make Rules
One of the explanations for the failure to make rules lies in the
uncertainty that the Ontario Securities Act confers this power on
the agency. The Kimber Committee alluded to this problem when it
recommended that section 72 of the old Act and other pertinent
sections be analysed to determine whether they would permit the
formulation of necessary policies by regulations.
26
Under the new Act no specific power is given to the Commission
itself. Sections relating to registration of salesmen, filing of prospec-
tuses and others give the Commission broad discretionary powers.
Because the Commission has not attempted to formulate policy
through rule-making until very recently, it is necessary to look to the
attitude of the courts with respect to similar action by other adminis-
trative bodies to determine whether or not the Commission has the
power.
In the case of Peterkin v. Hydro Electric Power Commission, the
court was confronted with an appeal by a landowner from an expro-
priation award of the Ontario Municipal Board.27 In fixing the amount
of compensation the Board referred to their experience that estimates
of construction cost exceed the actual cost by as much as 20 per cent.
The Court of Appeal held that the Board's function is not to proceed
on a basis which has no support in the evidence and cannot rest its
judgment on a rule of thumb of its own invention. Under the statute
the Board was given a discretion in fixing the compensation but no
specific power to enact regulations. This view was reiterated by the
same court in the recent case of Re Hopedale Developments Ltd. and
Oakville.28 There the Municipal Board refused the applicant's petition
on the grounds that he failed to bring his case within the principles
enunciated by the Board in earlier cases. McGillivray J.A. recognized
and encouraged the exercise of the right of an administrative agency
to formulate general principles by which it is to be guided. However,
he stated that the agency in deciding must not limit its consideration
to the application of these principles. These cases indicate that it is
permissible for an agency in the absence of statutory rule-making
power to enunciate principles which may be used as guidelines, but it
is prohibited from establishing standards which have the binding effect
of legislation. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal would
approve the formulation of rules by the Commission under the Securi-
ties Act as it now stands. Any future government action which would
make the O.S.C. an independent body must necessarily confer rule-
making power and would eliminate this problem.
There is another means by which the Commission could legally
enact policy rules under the present scheme. Section 144 of the new
26 Report of the Atty. General's Committee on Securities Legislation
in Ontario, s. 8.06.
27 [1958] O.W.N. 225.
28 [1965] O.R. 659.
[VOL. 5:210
1967] Ont. Securities Commn. as an Admin. Tribunal
Act provides that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regu-
lations with respect to some eighteen separate matters. These cover
all sections of the Act where the Commission is given discretionary
power, including the form and content of prospectuses, the preparation
of financial statements of the affairs of securities issuers, and require-
ments respecting applications for registration and renewal and expira-
tion of registrations. The final clause of this section confers a broad
power to make regulations respecting any matter necessary to carry
out the intent and purpose of the Act. However, such regulations must
be presented on completion to the Minister of Financial Affairs and
approved by the Cabinet. In view of the present public concern over
the operations of the Commission and the securities industry generally,
it is unlikely that these regulations will get a rubber stamp approval.
No doubt interested parties will pressure the government to alter those
rules which are unfavourable to their interests, amendments will be
made and some regulations dropped before approval is given by the
Cabinet. Although the power in section 144 is not absolute (the regu-
lations being subject to approval by a politically sensitive body), this
is the only means available for the formulation of policy by rule-
making. Presently, a committee is drafting regulations under section
144 in many of the above-mentioned areas which will clarify consider-
ably Commission policy. This is an encouraging development in the
current attempts by the Commission to implement the recommenda-
tions of the Kimber Committee concerning the use of regulations in
revealing policy to the industry.
VI. The American Approach
Although the legislation29 which created the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (S.E.C.) in the United States differs in many
areas from the Ontario Act, the basic intent of the two and the means
to achieve the end are similar. General principles are established in
these statutes to govern the operations of the securities industry and
administrative agencies are created to carry out the legislative pur-
poses. The experience of the S.E.C. has been that neither adjudication
nor rule-making alone is sufficient to implement the statute. While
some sections lend themselves to the adjudicative process, others are
enforced best by the codification of policy into a body of rules appli-
cable in the area governed by the section.
The American statutes have vested in the S.E.C. power to adopt
rules necessary for the enforcement of the Acts. 30 They have similar
provisions to the Ontario Act concerning prospectus filings, standards
of conduct for securities salesmen and licensing and revocation of
traders. This latter power is exercised in the discretion of the S.E.C.
which applies the same criteria as our statute (i.e., whether regis-
tration or revocation is in the public interest).
In the area of broker dealer selling practices the Commission has
adopted twenty-two rules over the years to implement the general
29 Securities Act, 48 Stat. 85 (1933), Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat.
903 (1934).
30 Id., s. 19(a); s. 23(a).
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statutory mandate to prohibit the use of manipulative, deceptive, or
other fraudulent device or contrivance.3 1 These rules include: prohibi-
tions against representations that registration with the S.E.C. indi-
cates Commission approval of the transaction,32 disclosure require-
ments which every broker must include in the written confirmation of
each securities transaction sent to the customer,33, requirements that
every financial statement set forth the assumptions on which a pro
forma financial statement purporting to give effect to the receipts of a
public offering is based.
3 4
Manuel Cohen and Joel Rabin (member of the S.E.C., and legal
assistant to the S.E.C. respectively), related the experience of the
Commission in choosing between rule-making and adjudication for
administering specific areas of the American securities legislation.3 5
Because specific rules may permit unethical (or ethical, depending on
the way you file income tax returns) persons to devise schemes to
avoid them, and in view of the unlimited variety of opportunities for
unethical practices presented in sales transactions the S.E.C. has relied
mainly on adjudication in the development of standards for selling
practices. Consequently, since 1934, only twenty-two rules have been
enacted in this area. Most of these rules already have been set out in
Part VIII of the new Ontario Act dealing with trading practices. In
the balance of this field the Americans have relied on adjudication
with the advantages resulting from its emphasis on the factual context
in the proceeding rather than on rigid principles. Problems such as
the fiduciary nature of the securities dealer's relationship with his
customer, boiler room operations with their high pressure telephone
solicitations, and such fraudulent manipulative practices as wash sales,
matched orders and transactions creating trading in a security to
induce transactions by others, have been best dealt with on a case by
case basis. Cohen feels it affords flexibility by giving the Commission
discretion in applying principles of earlier cases and the opportunity
for further modification of the principles in later cases. Since the
problems confronting the O.S.C. in this area are not unlike those of
the S.E.C. and, in view of the fact that Part VIII of the Ontario Act
covers the same area which the S.E.C. rules cover, it would seem that
the present reliance on a case-by-case adjudication in this area is the
most effective method of administration.
On the other hand, the S.E.C. has relied on detailed formal rules,
and informal procedures preliminary to drafting them, in regulating
proxy solicitations and disclosure requirements for new offerings of
securities under the Act. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 left the
problem of the nature, extent and form of federal proxy regulations
to the discretion of the S.E.C.. Section 14 required proxy solicitations
to conform with "such rules and regulations as the Commission may




35 29 Law and Contemporary Problems 691 (1964).
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prescribe as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of
investors". 36 Over the years the Commission has evolved proxy rules
pursuant to this power which deal with requirements of a brief descrip-
tion of the issues to be considered at the meeting together with action
proposed to be taken by the proxy, the mailing of other pertinent
material by management, a general prohibition against materially
false or misleading statements, and filing of preliminary proxy ma-
terial ten days before distribution so that the staff of the Commission
can examine and compel amendments to it.
The new Ontario Securities legislation is more specific than the
American Act in the proxy sections. Rather than delegating a broad
rule-making power to the O.S.C., it has enunciated the specific require-
ments in Part X. Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains in regard to
the requisite contents of the information circular.37 No preffling of the
circular is called for as in the S.E.C. rules. Consequently, an onus is
placed on management to decide what to disclose which may leave
them vulnerable to prosecution for breach of the Securities Act, or to
a civil action for damages. The Americans have removed some of the
uncertainty by enacting a rule which stipulates the contents of the
circulars sent out in the case of a proxy battle,38 although regulations
governing the normal unopposed situation have yet to be drafted.
The S.E.C. has removed much of the uncertainty which shrouded
the prospectus filing requirements in a similar manner. Rules were
formulated which include requirements concerning: financial state-
ments, auditor's reports, the independence of auditors, newspaper
prospectuses, size of type to be used in a prospectus, a statement on the
first page of every prospectus that the security has neither been ap-
proved nor disapproved by the S.E.C. There are encouraging signs that
the O.S.C. intends to follow the lead of the S.E.C. in resorting to rule-
making in this area. The new draft regulations (Part II) should
clarify the Commission policy towards disclosure in primary distribu-
tions.
Although further examination of the American approach to the
administration of their securities legislation is not possible at this
time, the above illustrations indicate that the O.S.C. could profit from
their experience in choosing between rule-making or adjudication in
those areas where the American and Ontario Acts are parallel.
Through the process of trial and error the S.E.C. has discovered which
approach is best in implementing particular sections of the legislation
and it is submitted that this experience should be utilised and applied
by the O.S.C.
One area where the Commission could benefit from the American
experience is in relation to unreported decisions. Because many ques-
tions of prospectus disclosure policy either never reach the stage of a
hearing before the Director (being settled informally through advisory
opinions of the Commission staff) or never are reported, the disclosure
requirements for primary distributions are very vague. While recog-
36 Supra, note 29, s. 14.
37 Supra, note 2, s. 102(1).
38 Interim Draft Regulations, s. 36.
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nizing a limited need for the Director to retain the broad discretionary
power given under section 61 and without losing the advantages of
adjudication to resolve certain questions in this area, the Commission
could codify those policy standards with respect to disclosure which
have previously been established in unreported hearings and informal
rulings. This would resolve many minor inconsistencies and provide
a single readily available source for those seeking to ascertain Com-
mission policy.
VII CONCLUSION
In his 1962 Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, Judge Henry
J. Friendly submitted that
wherever the legislature grants power to an agency in broad terms, it
is imperative that steps be taken over the years to define and clarify it-
to canalize the broad stream into narrower ones.39
Having administered certain sections of the Act for many years now,
the experience acquired and the cases adjudicated by the O.S.C. should
be reviewed and policies extracted and codified into a body of regula-
tions to govern the financial industry.
These regulations should not be too extensive (as too many rules
in this area can impede the smooth functioning of an economy),
though they should lay down general guidelines and principles which
define the policy followed by the Commission in exercising its dis-
cretionary powers. One example of the adverse result of intervention
by government in the market place is found in the effect on small
investors of the information required from a company before a public
distribution is permitted. One broker estimated that 70 per cent of
the good issues are distributed by private placement to large institu-
tional investors as a means of avoiding the disclosure requirements.
As a result, the public gets only a small percentage of the good issues
and the majority of the uncertain ones. Nor should the regulations
be too inflexible, lest they become outdated and unsuited for the fre-
quent and unforeseen changes in the securities field. Therefore, an
essential quality in a draftsman is the ability to anticipate the course
of future events, and to incorporate this in every regulation.
In the following areas where presently there is uncertainty as to
Commission policy, regulations formulated with the active participa-
tion of the financial community may dispel the doubt while improving
the administration of the Securities Act. As already mentioned, the
S.E.C. has taken steps to enunciate in regulations the disclosure and
accountancy requirements for prospectuses. Similar action is recom-
mended in Ontario. The discretion which the Commission would lose
by such action would not be as great a detriment to the public as
anticipated and would be outweighed by the advantages to the industry
of full knowledge of Commission policy. Although certain fraudulent
men may find ways of concealing information, the Report of the
Special Study of the Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission indicates that the effect of these individuals on the public
39 Friendly, The Federal Administration Agencies, 75 Harv. L.Rev. 863.
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will be minor. It discovered that individual investors did not use the
prospectus as a guide in investments and that the key to the purchase
was usually the salesman and the pitch he makes. Thus, the main
focus of efforts to protect the public should be on the salesman, and
the Commission must retain its broad discretion in determining
whether a salesman's conduct reaches the required standards of fair
dealing in each particular set of circumstances. Regulations which
could be circumvented would be harmful to the public in this area,
but this would not be the result of regulations in the prospectus field.
Recently the Commission has used adjudication to articulate its
policy with respect to releases of shares from escrow, 40 prerequisites
for registration,4' and the amount of consideration to be paid to a
promoter for his claims.42 Although this is a step in the right direction,
the adjudicative process, for the reasons set out above, is not the best
vehicle for articulating policy. The quality of these policies would
have been enhanced had they been formulated by the rule-making
process which provides an opportunity for interested parties not in-
volved in the litigation to participate, and for greater advanced plan-
ning.
Another area where the Commission might consider the enact-
ment of regulations to implement and clarify the policy of the Act is
section 139 which gives the Commission power to make decisions or
orders concerning trading of any security on or through the facilities
of a stock exchange. The former Attorney General, Kelso Roberts,
advocates the enactment of regulations or guidelines which enunciate
when and under what circumstances the O.S.C. must intervene in
areas which normally are under the jurisdiction of the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Though at a later date such regulations would be desirable,
it is submitted that the Commission has not had enough experience
in the area covered by this new section to enable it to lay down any
strict rules. The flexibility of discretion is needed at first to enable
the agency to develop expertise in dealing with a statutory power,
which can later be used as a basis for enacting regulations, and as a
guide in anticipating future developments.
Under the proxy solicitation section of the Act there is a need
for regulations which prescribe the degree of disclosure required in
the information circular. Since there is no requirement that the
circular be approved by the Commission, the onus is on management
to decide what points to disclose in the proxy. If there is insufficient
disclosure, presumably the corporation could be subject to criminal
charges or the Directors held liable in a civil action. Presently, regula-
tions are being drafted with the co-operation and participation of
lawyers involved in corporation work to clarify this section of the Act.
In considering the alternative of rule-making it must be remem-
bered that initially this process requires much time and effort; sub-
missions from the industry must be heard, previous adjudications
40 North Lodge, O.S.C. Sept. 1966 Bulletin.
41 Liberty Securities Ltd., O.S.C. Sept. 1966 Bulletin.
42 Prima Mines, O.S.C. Oct. 1966 Bulletin.
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reviewed and future trends anticipated. In discussing this problem,
William L. Carey, the present Chairman of the S.E.C. remarked:
Hand in hand with any effort of re-examination is the effort of getting
and keeping good people . . . the personnel problem is in part a function
of the budget, as reflected in salaries, promotions, and the opportunity to
bring in new and able young people-particularly lawyers.43
The question of the merits of rule-making as a means of admin-
istering the Securities Act will remain academic so long as the Com-
mission remains understaffed and under-financed. An illustration of
the need for a larger budget and more staff is the fact that as of this
date the position of Chief Commission Counsel is vacant. No lawyer
has been found who satisfies the prerequisites for the position, and
who is satisfied with the salary it offers. This is not the first time
that recommendations for the separation of the Commission from the
Legislature or for new approaches to financing and staffing have been
made.44 Nevertheless, the implementation of such recommendations
are actually conditions precedent to the adoption of any of the above
suggestions.
If rule-making is not possible immediately, promulgation of Com-
mission policy could be achieved by publication of all relevant cases in
monthly bulletins. At present, only a small percentage of the decisions
rendered are contained in the bulletins, and an "information gap" has
been created between the Commission and the community it governs.
The S.E.C. prevents this by publishing decisions in each of its areas
of authority. However, there is a feeling at the Commission that
publication of decisions favourable to registrants or to individuals
investigated would be unfair to the parties. A similar dilemma was
solved by the Revenue Department in Income Tax disputes by chang-
ing the names of parties to the litigation to numbers and altering the
facts to conceal their identity before publication of the decision. The
adoption of this method, or a procedure of publishing examples of
administrative rulings on accountancy and disclosure problems in
drafting prospectuses would avoid this problem of unfairness and
would assist the members of the industry dealing with the Commission.
In conclusion, the process of adjudication should not be thought of
as a mutually exclusive alternative to rule-making. Although it would
be an equally acceptable solution to the problem of informing the
industry of Commission policy, once formulated, it is submitted that
rule-making with its opportunity for advanced planning, informal pro-
ceedings and submissions from members of the industry, is a superior
process for the development of that policy. Therefore, the two should
be complimentary. If standards and requirements were enunciated in
the statute or in a body of regulations which the Commission could
apply to the day-to-day problems of administration, by resorting to
adjudication to resolve cases falling between, or not governed by, the
rules, the agency could fulfill the great aspirations the legislators and
the Commissioners presumably have for it.
43 29 Law and Contemporary Problems 651 (1964),
44 See-Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in Wind-
fall Mines Ltd. 99-103; Baillie, 8 Can. Pub. Admin., 172 at 252; Report of
Attorney General's Commission on Securities Legislation in Ontario, 66-68.
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